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KN-China, President Donald Trump returned from his visit to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on Friday, no closer to a solution to Iran’s closure of the vital Strait of Hormuz chokepoint than before the trip. Prior to the U.S.-Iran war, which resulted in Iran’s restriction of traffic through the Strait and a U.S. blockade of all of Iran’s ports, the PRC imported nearly half of its oil supplies from countries using the Strait. Beijing buys 90 percent of Iran’s daily oil exports. China’s energy needs led some experts to assess that PRC President Xi Jinping might offer to pressure Iran to accept U.S. proposals for a war-ending agreement that would fully reopen the waterway and, among other provisions, ensure Iran has no path to developing a working nuclear weapon. During the Trump visit, Iran sought to divide the two leaders on the Strait issue by allowing more than a dozen tankers laden with Gulf state and Iraqi oil safe passage through the waterway. The U.S. blockade of Iranian ports, which applies to the oil Iran wants to deliver to China, remains in place.
Referencing the contents of his discussions with Xi, U.S. President Trump told journalists: “[Xi] said, I would love to be a help, if I can be of any help whatsoever [resolving the Strait closure].” China’s official readouts of the Trump-Xi meetings did not confirm Trump’s account of Xi’s offers of assistance but did express Beijing’s clear interest in reopening its key energy supply route. Following the first Trump-Xi meeting, the spokesperson for China’s Foreign Ministry stated: “The maritime routes should be reopened as soon as possible in response to the calls of the international community, and joint efforts should be made to safeguard the stability and smooth functioning of global industrial and supply chains.” China’s official statements also reiterated support for Iran’s sovereignty and for an end to the conflict. The mixed messages from Beijing left Trump with the same options for reopening the Strait chokepoint as existed before the trip.
As U.S. officials turn their attention back to Iran after the China visit, they assert the status quo in the Strait is unacceptable. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said last week that Iran had stopped loading oil at its export terminal on Kharg Island, a sign that Iran is having difficulty managing U.S. economic pressure. An apparent oil spill around that island would appear to corroborate Bessent’s assertion. Iran and the U.S. continue to exchange proposals, and some gaps between the U.S. and Iranian positions on a nuclear accord appear to be narrowing. But there are no signs a diplomatic breakthrough is imminent, leaving Trump with the unpalatable choice of whether to escalate in order to reduce the Iranian threat to Strait shipping or accept terms for a negotiated settlement he has long ruled out as insufficient.
Iranian leaders assert they will not voluntarily relinquish their core strategic achievement in the war thus far – the ability of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy’s hundreds of armed fast attack craft, backed by short-range missiles and drones, to bottle up energy-laden tanker ships in the Persian Gulf. Iran calculates that the Strait closure’s impact on the global economy will pressure Trump to end the war on terms favorable to Tehran. Iranian leaders insist on charging fees for safe passage through the Strait. On Saturday, the head of the national security committee of Iran’s Majles (parliament), Ebrahim Azizi, posted on social media: “Iran: within the framework of its national sovereignty and the guarantee of international trade security, has prepared a professional mechanism to manage traffic in the Strait of Hormuz along a designated route, which will be unveiled soon. In this process, only commercial vessels and parties cooperating with Iran will benefit. The necessary fees will be collected for the specialized services provided under this mechanism. This route will remain closed to the operators of the so‑called ‘freedom project.’”
Azizi’s post suggests the IRGC Navy will enforce its threat to thwart a restart of Project Freedom, the U.S. military-assisted mission in early May to direct commercial ships to safe lanes in the Strait. The operation was aborted after one day due to reported fears in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait of Iranian retaliation, but reviving the mission is reportedly under active U.S. consideration. Project Freedom was supported by the U.S. Navy, but did not involve pre-emptive or preventive kinetic strikes against IRGC Navy small boats or Iran’s missile and drone emplacements. The modest U.S. military component might account for the operation’s meager results, even though the mission’s short lifespan complicates assessment of its effectiveness.
U.S. officials, including President Trump, have publicly discussed ordering an “enhanced” Project Freedom, or “Project Freedom Plus” — a term referenced by some press outlets. The option would presumably add a kinetic component to the earlier operation, intended to enhance its deterrent capacity and provide shipping firms the confidence they need to send their vessels through the Strait. The commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), Admiral Brad Cooper, testified before the Senate last week that, as a result of Operation Epic Fury: “The Iranian ability to stop commerce has been dramatically degraded through the Straits, but their voice is very loud, and those threats are clearly heard by the merchant industry and the insurance industry.” He acknowledged that Iran still maintains some capabilities to threaten ships moving through the Strait, even though the U.S. had destroyed more than 90 percent of Iran’s inventory of 8,000 naval mines to prevent their deployment in the Strait. Cooper testified that the U.S. military is capable of reopening the Strait, but doing so is a decision for policymakers, acknowledging that the crucial waterway is at the center of ongoing negotiations with Iran. A drone strike on Sunday, believed to have emanated from Iran, caused a fire at an electrical generator at the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant in the UAE. The strike signaled Tehran, by highlighting its ability to endanger the region, is intent on deterring the U.S. from using force to open the Strait.
As the Trump team evaluates options to open the Strait, regional states and their allies are looking to the longer term to permanently thwart Iran’s ability to disrupt global energy markets. During the crisis, Saudi Arabia has shunted more than half of its total oil exports from terminals on the Persian Gulf to those at the port of Yanbu, on the Red Sea. Similarly, the UAE has diverted more than half of its oil exports to a pipeline from the Habshan processing plant to the Fujairah emirate, on the Gulf of Oman, avoiding the Strait of Hormuz. On May 1, the UAE exited OPEC, signaling it no longer will be held to production quotas imposed by Saudi-dominated OPEC and OPEC+. On Friday, the UAE government announced it would accelerate development of an additional oil export pipeline to Fujairah, which will double its ability to export oil through that route to 3.6 million barrels per day from the current volume of 1.8 million barrels per day. The government claims the new line will be operational in 2027.
It is likely that the other Gulf states, as well as Iraq, will develop projects that will reduce their reliance on access to the Strait of Hormuz. Kuwait and Bahrain currently have no alternatives to exporting oil through the Strait, but both are closely aligned with Saudi Arabia and could partner with the Kingdom to develop alternative oil pipeline routes. Iraq is likely to revisit a solution conceived by the regime of Saddam Hussein, but not pursued because of that regime’s regional isolation. The planned pipeline would run southwest from the oil fields of Basra, through the Jordanian desert, and terminate at Jordan’s Red Sea port of Aqaba. The project was envisioned to carry as much as 2.25 million barrels per day, a volume that would offset most of what the Strait closure has removed from the market. The operational segment of an existing Iraq-Türkiye pipeline runs through Kurdish-controlled territory in northern Iraq, carrying about 200,000 – 250,000 barrels per day of oil produced in the Kurdish region. Baghdad has limited access to the route to export oil from fields in southern Iraq, where the bulk of Iraq’s oil is produced.
As noted by the New York Times on Sunday, Qatar has no clear alternative to using the Strait. Its liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers need to pass through the chokepoint, and its gas supply is derived from a natural gas field in the Persian Gulf shared with Iran. Qatar left OPEC in 2019 to focus its investments on LNG exports, for which the country is a market leader, but it still exports oil. Iranian drones damaged the country’s large Ras Laffan LNG processing facility during the war. Doha appears to have few choices other than engaging with Iran — and possibly accepting its imposition of fees — to ensure its energy exports reach Qatar’s customers.
Photo: Trump (Reuters-Kevin Lamarque)
