Glembert
KN. Israel launched its long-awaited retaliatory attack on Iran in response to Iran’s October 1 barrage of 180 ballistic missiles against Israel. The Iranian launches were in response to Israel’s killing of top Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in late July and of Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah on September 27. Some Iranian missiles penetrated Israeli defenses, which were aided by U.S. and allied defensive action, but generally caused minor damage.
In contrast to past Israeli operations on Iranian territory, Israeli officials openly announced the retaliation, which reportedly involved 100 combat aircraft, including the U.S.-supplied F-35 Stealth Fighter. According to available information, the attack consisted of air strikes on 20 total sites. A first wave targeted Russia-supplied S-300 and other air defense batteries and radar stations. The systems and more basic anti-aircraft fire sought to engage the attacking aircraft, but despite Iranian claims, the defenses were ineffective. Israeli military leaders stated all Israeli aircraft returned safely. Subsequent waves focused on missile and armed drone bases and production facilities under the control of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force, which runs Iran’s missile and armed drone programs.
The target sets seemed to uphold Israeli pledges to U.S. officials to reduce the potential for Iranian escalation by avoiding sensitive nuclear enrichment sites, energy production and export facilities, or Iranian leadership targets. Virtually all of the targets were well outside Tehran and other major cities – a selection apparently intended to avoid disrupting civilian life and enabling Iranian authorities to minimize the effect of the action. Iranian media announced the main international airport in Tehran had reopened for normal operations within hours after the attack ended.
Even though the battle damage assessments and the scope of the Israeli action are becoming clear, the likely trajectory of the Israel-Iran conflict remains opaque. The early reactions from Iranian state media lacked specific vows to retaliate and suggested Iran might consider the October round of attacks and response closed, perhaps paving the way for broader regional de-escalation. Iranian authorities claimed the strikes did “limited damage.” And, Iran stated that four Iranian military personnel were killed in the strikes – a number low enough that Iranian leaders might be able to justify not responding. (Ten Iranian security forces were killed in the mostly Baluch-inhabited area in eastern Iran, near the Pakistani border, nearly simultaneously with the Israeli strikes. However, the deaths appeared to be the result of an attack by Sunni Islamic separatists of the Jaysh al-Adl organization that periodically attacks regime forces – and was not directly connected to the Israeli strikes.)
However, in its formal response, Iran’s Foreign Ministry stated the “Islamic Republic of Iran considers itself entitled and obliged to defend itself against foreign acts of aggression, based on its inherent right of legitimate defense, which is also reflected in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.” Hardliners in Iran’s Majles (elected parliament) insisted the strikes breached Iranian red lines and required a swift response. The Ministry statement also sought to tie the Israeli strike to Iran’s broader effort to discredit Israel for its military responses to the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack, perhaps indicating Iran might delegate its armed response to its regional allies that are already battling Israel. According to the Foreign Ministry statement: “the [Israeli] genocide of the Palestinian people and aggression against Lebanon – which has continued in the shadow of the all-round military and political support of the United States and some other Western countries – is the main cause of tension and insecurity in is the area.” The Foreign Ministry statement, coupled with agitation by hardliners, leaves open the possibility that the strike might not have accomplished the objective of re-establishing deterrence of Iran.
Even if Iran’s leaders decline to respond to the Saturday strikes, it is almost certain that the Iran-Israel conflict will escalate further in the weeks ahead and beyond. The trajectory of conflict seems clear regardless of which candidate is elected as U.S. President on November 5. Although the Saturday strike abided by the limitations urged by U.S. leaders, Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has made no promises to stop attacking Iran’s regional allies, particularly Lebanese Hezbollah, in an effort to force Iran and its Axis of Resistance partners to cease rocket, missile, and drone attacks on Israeli territory. Israel’s campaign against Lebanese Hezbollah has included strikes on IRGC targets in Syria, and the potential is substantial for an Israeli attack on a high-ranking IRGC target there or elsewhere to trigger another Iranian missile barrage or other response. Many experts foresee further rounds of Iran-Israel attacks and responses as both sides seek to deter the other and establish escalation dominance.
Israel’s choice of targets suggested it sees further conflict ahead. By damaging Iran’s air defenses and radar system, Israel has made it easier for its fighter jets to attack Iran in the future. Degrading Iran’s air defense capability sends a message to Tehran that a forceful Iranian response to the Israeli strike could trigger a more expansive retaliatory attack by Israel. By focusing its strike on missile and drone launch and production sites, Israel might also have hoped to degrade Iran’s ability to respond with missile and armed drone attacks against Israel. However, Iran is believed to possess more than 3,000 ballistic missiles, and one Israeli strike, no matter how large, would not cripple that capability.
Israeli leaders have signaled to their U.S. counterparts that the next Israeli counterstrike, if Tehran provokes one, is likely to include targets that Israel purposely avoided on Saturday. The target set for a subsequent round of Israeli strikes is likely to include Iranian leadership figures, energy-related installations, and, possibly, Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. In communicating this implicit threat, Netanyahu and his close associates also sought to compel Tehran to instruct its regional allies, particularly Hezbollah, to cease further attacks on Israeli territory. Yet, targeting high-profile sites also increases the likelihood Iran will try to escalate in response.
A further round of Israeli and Iranian escalation significantly increases the likelihood of direct U.S. involvement in the conflict with Iran. Some experts speculate that Israeli strategy intentionally seeks to embroil the United States in conflict with Iran. For example, achieving the comprehensive destruction of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure – a longstanding Israeli goal – would likely require U.S. participation to penetrate hardened sites such as the uranium enrichment facility at Fordow. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, who is constitutionally the commander-in-chief of Iran’s armed forces, has consistently sought to avoid war on Iranian soil, particularly attacks conducted by U.S. forces. He has been seeking to calibrate Iran’s reactions to Israeli provocations to avoid justifying any action against Iran by the United States. Yet, internal pressure on the Leader to respond to certain Israeli attacks could yet cause Khamene’i to cross Washington’s red lines and trigger a U.S. response.
U.S. leaders, in direct and indirect talks with Iranian officials, have consistently indicated they do not want the regional skirmishes to escalate into a U.S.-Iran war. While issuing a categorical denial of U.S. involvement in the Saturday Israeli operation, U.S. officials also warned Tehran not to respond to the strikes. As Iran and Israel have engaged in direct conflict throughout 2024, the U.S. has placed additional military assets in the region, particularly air defense systems. Any Iranian escalation against Israel has the potential to strike U.S. military personnel who are deployed all over the region, particularly in the Arab monarchy states of the Persian Gulf. U.S. officials have sought strenuously since the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack to keep war contained and U.S. forces involved only to the extent necessary to retaliate for Iran-backed attacks or to prevent the Houthi movement in Yemen from attacking commercial shipping. However, the U.S. commitment to the defense of Israel – coupled with Israel’s drive to deliver a “knockout blow” against Tehran – might yet thwart Washington’s best efforts to stay on the sidelines of Iran-Israel warfare.
