After Venezuela, the United States Could Turn its Attention to the Cuban Regime

KN. Trump posted on his Truth Social account on January 11 that, “Cuba lived, for many years, on large amounts of OIL and MONEY from Venezuela. In return, Cuba provided ‘Security Services’ for the last two Venezuelan dictators, BUT NOT ANYMORE!” And “THERE WILL BE NO MORE OIL OR MONEY GOING TO CUBA – ZERO! I strongly suggest they make a deal, BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE.” The rivalry between Washington and Havana dates back to the Cold War and American attempts to meddle with the government of Cuba, where intelligence operations sought to depose Fidel Castro’s Communist regime and replace it with a government more pliable to U.S. demands.

In more recent decades, Cuba’s energy security has been heavily reliant on Venezuela, making the halt in Venezuelan oil shipments an acute pressure point for Havana. Since the early 2000s, Venezuela supplied Cuba with heavily subsidized crude in exchange for Cuban services such as security, intelligence, and medical services. Venezuela’s oil exports account for approximately 50 percent of Cuba’s oil deficit, according to Reuters. Cuba produces only a fraction of the oil it consumes and lacks the foreign currency reserves to purchase sufficient fuel from international markets. Longstanding sanctions have kept Cuba’s infrastructure dilapidated and difficult to repair.

The sudden disruption is expected to intensify Cuba’s already severe economic and infrastructure crisis. Even before Maduro’s capture, Cuba’s electrical grid was operating under chronic strain, prompting frequent nationwide blackouts to the island’s 10 million inhabitants. The loss of Venezuelan oil is expected to exacerbate these conditions, increasing the frequency and duration of blackouts, constraining public transportation, disrupting food refrigeration and water treatment, and further impacting economic output. Alternative suppliers, including shipments from Mexico, fall far short of replacing Venezuelan output. Additionally, it has been reported that Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum is weighing whether to continue its oil shipments to Cuba amid fears Mexico could face retaliation from the United States.

U.S. officials appear to view the deepened energy and economic crisis as a source of strategic leverage. According to Foreign Policy, the Trump administration has explicitly linked the recent changes in Venezuela to Cuba’s growing isolation, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a Cuban American himself. Rubio has echoed the linkage in statements to NBC News, asserting that Cuban intelligence and security services were instrumental in propping up Maduro’s rule and that Havana should now face consequences for its role. At the same time, however, internal administration deliberations suggest uncertainty about how far the U.S. should push. According to Politico, some officials, including Rubio, support more aggressive approaches such as imposing a blockade on all oil imports to Cuba, though no decision has been made on this to date. Others reportedly are wary of the unintended consequences a blockade could cause, such as mass migration or a humanitarian crisis.

Additionally, the Wall Street Journal reports that the Trump administration increasingly sees toppling the Cuban regime as a central test of its national security strategy in the Western Hemisphere. Trump’s embrace of the Monroe Doctrine has led the current Administration to craft a strategy of hemispheric hegemony, with the goal of completely diminishing Russian, Iranian, and Chinese influence from North, Central, and South America. From this perspective, the collapse of Venezuela’s oil support presents a rare opening to destabilize Cuba without military intervention, with proponents of this approach arguing that sustained economic pressure, combined with worsening energy shortages, could trigger popular unrest. Critics, however, counter that the Cuban regime has historically demonstrated resilience in the face of economic hardship, such as the fall of the Soviet Union and decades of U.S. sanctions.

Havana has responded to Washington’s rhetoric, denouncing U.S. actions, with Cuban foreign minister Bruno Rodriguez stating the country does not lend itself to “blackmail or military coercion against other States.” Additionally, Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel has stated in response to Trump’s comments on Cuba that Cuba is a “free, independent, and sovereign” country and would defend itself “to the last drop of blood,” according to Al-Jazeera. President Diaz-Canel oversaw military exercises over the weekend as part of Cuba’s third National Defense Day, in which Diaz-Canel highlighted the importance of the island being combat-ready on social media by quoting Cuban revolutionary Fidel Castro: “As long as imperialism exists, the Party, the State, and the people will devote the utmost attention to the services of the defense. The revolutionary guard will never be neglected.” As of now, no talks are scheduled between Washington and Havana.

A critical factor complicating U.S. efforts to bring Havana to the negotiating table is the difference in political structure between Venezuela and Cuba. Venezuela, despite the Maduro government’s authoritarian consolidation, retained remnants of electoral institutions and an identifiable opposition party. Cuba, by contrast, is far more politically compact. Experts note that Cuba’s system not only lacks legitimate electoral mechanisms but also a credible opposition capable of representing alternative political leadership. This makes Havana far more resistant to the externally driven negotiations that Trump seeks. In Cuba, the centralized role of the Communist Party of Cuba and its commitment to the party will certainly prove more difficult to crack than the Venezuelan government’s quick warming to the U.S. following Maduro’s capture.

Washington’s pivot toward Cuba following the capture of Maduro thus represents a high-stakes gamble. By severing Venezuela’s oil lifeline and signaling a willingness to escalate pressure, the Trump administration is clear on its desire to reshape the political landscape of the Western Hemisphere. Whether the approach produces meaningful concessions, internal fracture, or instead deepens humanitarian insecurity and regional instability, remains to be seen. However, the complexity of Cuba’s internal politics and enduring ideological resilience present significant hurdles that will be harder to overcome than in Venezuela (TSC).